Petya – Recommendations Updates

In our previous blog, we saw technical details and fix recommendations from various security agencies and security professionals.

According to multiple reports, this Petya ransomware campaign has infected organizations in several sectors including finance, transportation, energy, commercial facilities, and healthcare. While these victims are business entities, other Windows systems without patches installed for the vulnerabilities in MS17‑010, CVE-2017-0144, and CVE-2017-0145 are at risk of infection.

Negative consequences of ransomware infection include the following:

  • temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information,
  • disruption to regular operations,
  • financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and
  • potential harm to an organization’s reputation.
Solution

NCCIC recommends against paying ransoms; doing so enriches malicious actors while offering no guarantee that the encrypted files will be released. In this incident, the email address for payment validation was shut down by the email provider, so payment is especially unlikely to lead to data recovery. [1](link is external) According to the reports, below sites are C2 payment sites for this activity. These sites are not included in the CSV package as IOCs.

hxxp://mischapuk6hyrn72[.]onion/
hxxp://petya3jxfp2f7g3i[.]onion/
hxxp://petya3sen7dyko2n[.]onion/
hxxp://mischa5xyix2mrhd[.]onion/MZ2MMJ
hxxp://mischapuk6hyrn72[.]onion/MZ2MMJ
hxxp://petya3jxfp2f7g3i[.]onion/MZ2MMJ
hxxp://petya3sen7dyko2n[.]onion/MZ2MMJ

Network Signatures

Organizations are recommended to coordinate with their security vendors to ensure appropriate coverage for this threat. Because there is overlap between the WannaCry and Petya activities, many of the available rulesets can protect against both malware strains when appropriately implemented. The following rulesets provided in publically available sources may help detect this activity:

  • sid:2001569, “ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 445 traffic Potential Scan or Infection”[2](link is external)
  • sid:2012063, “ET NETBIOS Microsoft SRV2.SYS SMB Negotiate ProcessID? Function Table Dereference (CVE-2009-3103)”[3](link is external)
  • sid:2024297, “ET CURRENT_EVENTS ETERNALBLUE Exploit M2 MS17-010”[4](link is external)
Recommended Steps for Prevention
  • Apply the Microsoft patch for the MS17-010 SMB vulnerability dated March 14, 2017.[5](link is external)
  • Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users and authenticate in-bound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
  • Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files from reaching the end users.
  • Ensure anti-virus and anti-malware solutions are set to automatically conduct regular scans.
  • Manage the use of privileged accounts. Implement the principle of least privilege. No users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed. Those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary.
  • Configure access controls including file, directory, and network share permissions with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files, they should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares.
  • Disable macro scripts from Microsoft Office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full Office suite applications.
  • Develop, institute, and practice employee education programs for identifying scams, malicious links, and attempted social engineering.
  • Run regular penetration tests against the network, no less than once a year. Ideally, run these as often as possible and practical.
  • Test your backups to ensure they work correctly upon use.
  • Utilize host-based firewalls and block workstation-to-workstation communications.
Recommendations for Network Protection
  • Disable SMBv1 and
  • Block all versions of SMB at the network boundary by blocking TCP port 445 with related protocols on UDP ports 137-138 and TCP port 139, for all boundary devices.

Note: disabling or blocking SMB may create problems by obstructing access to shared files, data, or devices. The benefits of mitigation should be weighed against potential disruptions to users.

Review US-CERT’s Alert on The Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations [6] and consider implementing the following best practices:

  1. Segregate networks and functions.
  2. Limit unnecessary lateral communications.
  3. Harden network devices.
  4. Secure access to infrastructure devices.
  5. Perform out-of-band network management.
  6. Validate integrity of hardware and software.
Recommended Steps for Remediation
  • Contact law enforcement. We strongly encourage you to contact a local Cyber Security Incidence Report office upon discovery to report an intrusion and request assistance. Maintain and provide relevant logs.
  • Implement your security incident response and business continuity plan. Ideally, organizations should ensure they have appropriate backups so their response is simply to restore the data from a known clean backup.
General Advice for Defending Against Ransomware

Precautionary measures to mitigate ransomware threats include:

  • Ensure anti-virus software is up-to-date.
  • Implement a data backup and recovery plan to maintain copies of sensitive or proprietary data in a separate and secure location. Backup copies of sensitive data should not be readily accessible from local networks.
  • Scrutinize links contained in emails, and do not open attachments included in unsolicited emails.
  • Only download software—especially free software—from sites you know and trust.
  • Enable automated patches for your operating system and Web browser.

Until next time, stay secure.

SecureFirst Solutions Private Limited is a security centric Product-cum-Services Organization assisting its Clients to develop and maintain security applications. Our offerings are classified broadly into two categories:
1. Product: Vulnerability Management System (VMS)
2. Services: Security as a Service (SaaS)
3. On-premise classroom trainings

Download our brochure at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/downloads/SecureFirstSolutions_Brochure.pdf

Learn more about our Security Offerings at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/

References

 

Petya – Ransomware, malware, worm, virus

PETYA !! What’s in the name ? A thick black smoke which crashed the world with its jet BLACK screen and RED font.

When a security professional identifies a SQL Injection, Cross-site Scripting (XSS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) or even coincidently stumbled upon a Remote Code Execution (RCE) attack, the Development team’s first reaction to the list of reported vulnerabilities will be “So What the Fuzz?? What is the impact to the Business?? We have invested heavily in Web Application Firewall (WAF), load balancers; given proper KT to Developers on security, etc. do you think we all are dumb and WAFs are incapable of stopping a simple RCE?? We are running the latest version of TLS and have a proper Patch Management Process in-place. We will keep aside your findings, since our Clients want this Application to move to Production tonight, give us a sign-off or face my wrath”. Now is the time for those Security Professionals to show such Development Teams real-time consequences of not fixing those identified security vulnerabilities.

  • Recent Past:
    • Brief: On May 12th 2017, the world woke up and helplessly saw a massive Ransomware attack their computers by encrypting all their personal data on their respective computers. This Ransomware was named WannaCry / WannaCrypt.
    • Technical Details:
    • Attack pattern: Mostly received as part of a Phishing email:
      • Users receive a infected file, opens the file and lets malicious code into the computer
      • The code then executes by encrypting most of the file formats with a encryption on a remote command control server and locks down all the user data on the local user machine
      • Once the encryption process is complete, users are requested to reboot their computers after which users will be unable to access any files
      • A Ransom demand screen is displayed to the end user who tries accessing their own files, demanding them to make a payment of $300 in BitCoins to get the decryption key
      • User makes the payments, there were no records of any user getting back their encrypted data
    • The fix: Though this Ransomware created a mess overnight and infected nearly 3,00,000 computers worldwide, this attack was short-lived since a security researcher stumbled upon the fix by accidently buying a domain ending with “gwea.com” thus putting an end to this nightmare
  • Present:
    • Brief: Even before the world could come out of the threat from WannaCry, there were several rumours of the second version of the same Ramsomware. UIWIX was one such infamous Ramsomware which couldn’t make a great hype in the market. On the 27th of June 2017, the world was unknowingly awaiting to embrace a similar but much effective version of WannaCry. This time the name was inherited from one of the earlier Ransomware’ namely PETYA. As of Tuesday, Microsoft countedat least 12,500 infected systems across 65 countries and counting. Those include Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Denmark, Germany, Russia and the United States.
    • Technical Details:

Petya is a ransomware family which crashes the system by gaining access to the Master Boot Record (MBR). This spreads over the windows Server Message Block (SMB), reportedly using the ETERNALBLUE exploit tool, which exploits the CVE-2017-0144 vulnerability initially released by Shadow Brokers in April 2017.

Petya also called as NotPetya, SortaPetya, Petna, ExPetr, GoldenEye and Nyetya was initially believed to be a Ransomware, however there are some security practioners who claim Petya to be a wiper which deletes data completely from ones hard disk making it impossible for the user to access his/her files again.

Source: https://twitter.com/ntisec/status/879698154161152000
Source: https://twitter.com/ntisec/status/879698154161152000

Observations by security experts:

  • In a Ransomware attack, each victim gets supplied with a unique bitcoin address to help attackers know who has paid. But NotPetya gives the same address to every victim
  • The listed email was an account hosted by the German company Posteo, was quickly shut the account down, thus making it impossible for victims to reach the attackers
  • Even if a victim paid the ransom, security firm Kaspersky Labsuspects that NotPetya’s developers can’t decrypt any computers
  • In the case of NotPetya, the installation ID, which a victim who has paid must furnish to the attackers, so they can reveal the decryption key to a victim, is comprised solely of random data
  • “That means that the attacker cannot extract any decryption information from such a randomly generated string displayed on the victim, and as a result, the victims will not be able to decrypt any of the encrypted disks using the installation ID,” Kaspersky Lab researchers Anton Ivanov and Orkhan Mamedov write
    • Attack Pattern:
      • Petya Attack Pattern

      • Infection: Well-known Ukrainian software MEDoc was infected with the Petya DLL by attackers to deliver the same to its end users
      • Installation: This variant of Petya is spread as a DLL file and id dependent on another process before it takes action on the system. Once executed, the Master Boot Record (MBR) is overwritten and creates a scheduled task to reboot the system. After the system reboots, the malware displays a fake “chkdisk” scan which tricks the victim into believing the program is repairing their hard drive. In reality, the malware is encrypting the NTFS Master File Table in the background. The fake chkdisk completes and the malware displays a ransom note which demands a payment of $300 in bitcoin
      • Communication: Petya contains no Command and Control mechanisms that are currently known. After a host is infected, there is no communication from the malware back to the attacker
      • Circulation: Petya uses the following mechanisms to spread across hosts:
        • Scans the local /24 to discover enumerate ADMIN$ shares on other systems, then copies itself to those hosts and executes the malware using PSEXEC. This is only possible if the infected user has the rights to write files and execute them on system hosting the share
        • Uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) tool to connect to hosts on the local subnet and attempts to execute itself remotely on those hosts. It can use Mimikatzto extract credentials from the infected system and use them to execute itself on the targeted host
        • And finally attempts to use the ETERNALBLUE exploit tool against hosts on the local subnet. This will only be successful if the targeted host does not have the MS17-010 patches deployed
      • The fix: Here are some fix recommendations from various sites to help protect users from this ransomware malware worm from infecting your computers
      • Future: Not sure how much this hurts the human emotions, but future is not all can foresee. [On a lighter note] We have to look up to the Prophecies documented by Nostradamus to help us find an answer to all these human pains. [On a serious note, as said by a great person] If a hacker wants to attack you, there is nothing much that you can do to stop, but just make it harder for him/her to attack.
      • Reason behind all these attacks: Phishing emails, ignorance from users, SMB version 1, NSA, Shadow Brokers, EternalBlue, MEDoc, Petya DLL

 

Conclusion:

WannaCry and Petya are just the tip of the iceberg, there are many such security vulnerabilities out in the wild just waiting to be unleashed. Ransomware is undoubtedly the current threat to be dealt with and ASAP. The actors behind this threat are continuously experimenting & enhancing their hacking skills on real-time users and creating havoc globally.

This is not the time to freak out; it’s a learning curve for both hackers and end users. With the current day scenario, there are going to be a lot of openings in the information security field. So keep yourselves updated, educated and remember – ignorance is not an option

Until next time, stay secure.


SecureFirst Solutions Private Limited is a security centric Product-cum-Services Organization assisting its Clients to develop and maintain security applications. Our offerings are classified broadly into two categories:
1. Product: Vulnerability Management System (VMS)
2. Services: Security as a Service (SaaS)
3. On-premise classroom trainings

Download our brochure at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/downloads/SecureFirstSolutions_Brochure.pdf

Learn more about our Security Offerings at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/

References:

 

UIWIX Ransomware

By now we are aware of what happened on May 12, 2017 a new variant of the Ransom.CryptXXX family (Detected as Ransom.Wannacry) of ransomware began spreading widely impacting a large number of organizations, particularly in Europe.

 

Just within a weeks time that is on May 17, 2017 another Ransomware namely: UIWIX is out to disrupt the market.

 

This Ransomware arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites. It connects to certain websites to send and receive information.

Figure 1 Ransom demand screen displayed by UIWIX Trojan
Figure 1 Ransom demand screen displayed by UIWIX Trojan 

This Ransomware avoids encrypting files with the following strings in their file name:

  • .com; .sys; boot.ini; Bootfont.bin; bootmgr; BOOTNXT; BOOTSECT.BAK; NTEDETECT.COM; ntldr; NTUSER.DAT; PDOXUSRS.NET
  • \Windows; \Program Files

It avoids encrypting files on machines that have a locale set to Russia, Kazakhstan, or Belarus.

Microsoft solution:

Run antivirus or antimalware software. Use the following free Microsoft software to detect and remove this threat:·         Windows Defender Antivirus  for Windows 10 and Windows 8.1, or Microsoft Security Essentials for Windows 7 and Windows Vista

You should also run a full scan. A full scan might find hidden malware.

Advanced troubleshooting: To restore your PC, you might need to download and run Windows Defender Offline. See Microsoft’s advanced troubleshooting page for more help.

 

Threat Behavior:

This ransomware can arrive on a machine by leveraging the following vulnerability:

Figure 2 UIWIX Email
Figure 2 UIWIX Email

Installation

The malware creates the following named mutex:

  • hfdXrXzQBcKLlsrZ

The malware will not run if a debugger is present, or if any of the following virtualized or sandboxed environments are found:

  • Avast; Comodo; Cuckoo; Sandboxie; Sunblet Sandbox; VirtualBox; VirtualPC; VMWare; WpePro

Payload

Attempts to encrypt files

The ransomware attempts to encrypt all the files on the machine, except for the following:

  • Files that are in the following folders:
    • <DRIVE_LETTER>:\Windows
    • <DRIVE_LETTER>:\Program Files
  • Files with file names that contain any of the following strings:
    • .com; .sys; boot.ini; Bootfont.bin; Bootmgr; BOOTNXT; BOOTSECT.BAK; NTDETECT.COM; Ntldr; NTUSER.DAT; PDOXUSRS.NET

It avoids encrypting files on machines that have a locale set to Russia, Kazakhstan, or Belarus.

Once encryption is carried out, the malware appends a unique identifier to the encrypted file, along with the “.UIWIX” extension.

For example, if a file named picture.jpg is encrypted, its resulting name will be picture.jpg._<identifier string>.UIWIX.

Demands ransom

A text file containing the ransom note, named _DECODE_FILES.txt, is also dropped in the malware’s current directory. The ransom note contains the following text:

    >>> ALL YOUR PERSONAL FILES ARE DECODED <<<

    Your personal code: <identifier>

    To decrypt your files, you need to buy special software. 
     Do notattempt to decode or modify files, it may be broken. 
     To restore data, follow the instructions!

    You can learnmore at this site: 
     <TOR link>
     <TOR link>
     <TOR link>

    If a resource is unavailable for a long time to install and use the tor browser. 
     After you start the Tor browser you need to open this link <TOR link>

Steals credentials

The malware can steal credentials and other information from the following browsers:

  • Chrome; Comodo Dragon; Microsoft Edge; Firefox; Internet Explorer; Opera; Safari; Yandex

It can also steal credentials from the following applications:

  • FileZilla; Jabber; Miranda; Outlook; Rdp; SmartFtp; Thunderbird; Windows Live

Attempts to connect to URLs

The malware may try to contact the following URLs:

  • http://<random characters>.onion/gt34987.php
  • https://netcologne.dl.sourceforge.net/project/cyqlite/3.8.5/sqlite-dll-win32-x86-3080500.zip
  • http://sqlite.org/2014/sqlite-dll-win32-x86-3080500.zip

References

Zomato confirms 17millions user credentials put on sale by hackers

[Update: 18-May-2017] 60% of our users use third party OAuth services (i.e. Google and Facebook) for logging in to Zomato. We don’t have any passwords for these accounts – therefore, these users are at zero risk – both within Zomato, as well as on Google and Facebook (and any other services where the same Google/Facebook ID is being used to log in). For all our other users, as a safety measure, we strongly advise changing your passwords on other services where you might have used the same password as Zomato – we are also sending emails to such users prompting them to do the same as we speak.

 

[Earlier: 17-May-2017] Over 120 million users visit Zomato every month. What binds all of these varied individuals is the desire to enjoy the best a city has to offer, in terms of food. When Zomato users trust us with their personal information, they naturally expect the information to be safeguarded. And that’s something we do diligently, without fail. We take cyber security very seriously – if you’ve been a regular at Zomato for years, you’d agree.

 

The reason you’re reading this blog post is because of a recent discovery by our security team – about 17 million user records from our database were stolen. The stolen information has user email addresses and hashed passwords.

We hash passwords with a one-way hashing algorithm, with multiple hashing iterations and individual salt per password. This means your password cannot be easily converted back to plain text. We however, strongly advise you to change your password for any other services where you are using the same password.

 

Important note – payment related information on Zomato is stored separately from this (stolen) data in a highly secure PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) compliant vault. No payment information or credit card data has been stolen/leaked.

 

As a precaution, we have reset the passwords for all affected users and logged them out of the app and website. Our team is actively scanning all possible breach vectors and closing any gaps in our environment. So far, it looks like an internal (human) security breach – some employee’s development account got compromised. [Update: The hacker has provided exact details of how he/she stole the data. The loophole has been plugged to prevent any further data leakage. Complete update:http://blog.zomato.com/post/160807042556/security-notice-update]

 

How can this stolen information be misused?

Since we have reset the passwords for all affected users and logged them out of the app and website, your zomato account is secure. Your credit card information on Zomato is fully secure, so there’s nothing to worry about there.

 

What next?

Over the next couple of days and weeks, we’ll be actively working to plug any more security gaps that we find in our systems.

  • We’ll be further enhancing security measures for all user information stored within our database
  • A layer of authorisation will be added for internal teams having access to this data to avoid the possibility of any human breach.

We regret any disruption this may cause and appreciate your immediate attention to this information. If you have queries/concerns, please do not hesitate to contact our security team by sending an email directly to support@zomato.com and we’ll reach out to you right away.

Source: http://blog.zomato.com/post/160791675411/security-notice

WannaCry Ransomware: UPDATE

WannaCry Ransomware: UPDATE

Update Published: Thursday, May 18, 2017

In Short

DO NOT REBOOT your infected machines and TRY wanakiwi ASAP*!
*ASAP because prime numbers may be over written in memory after a while. More details available from the Author

Update Published: Tuesday, May 16, 2017 5:04PM IST

How it all started?

During the first week of February 2017, a security researcher publicly disclosed a zero-day vulnerability in Windows 10, Windows 8.1 and Server editions after Microsoft failed to patch it in the past three months.

 

The zero-day memory corruption flaw resides in the implementation of the SMB (server message block) network file sharing protocol that could allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to crash systems with denial of service attack, which would then open them to more possible attacks.

According to US-CERT, the vulnerability could also be exploited to execute arbitrary code with Windows kernel privileges on vulnerable systems, but this has not been confirmed right now by Microsoft.

“By connecting to a malicious SMB server, a vulnerable Windows client system may crash (BSOD) in mrxsmb20.sys.”Current Day Scenario

WannaCry Ransomware: 22-year-old ‘accidentally’ stops attacks, warns against more to come. WannaCry ransomware has affected more than 200,000 victims in 150 countries, which also includes India.

Very recently, a 22-year-old came in as a blessing in disguise when he accidentally put a halt to a vast number of attacks by the devastating WannaCry ransomware by buying a domain name hidden in the program for about £8.29 (Rs 700 approximately). WannaCry ransomware essentially locks a user out of their computer and demands a ransom paid in BitCoin to return control. The young analyst, whose identity is still concealed, tweets by the name of MalwareTech on Twitter, and works for a security firm called Kryptos Logic. He admitted that he had not realized that buying the domain name would have this fortunate effect.

I will confess that I was unaware registering the domain would stop the malware until after i registered it, so initially it was accidental.

— MalwareTech (@MalwareTechBlog) May 13, 2017
How he basically disabled the ransomware attack

The attack was that a particular domain name which was purchased by him, is believed to have been written into the software by the hackers to act as a kill switch. Therefore, each time the program tried to infect a computer, it would try to contact the web page; if it failed, WannaCry would carry on with the attack, but if it succeeded it would stop.

In an interview with the Daily Beast, MalwareTech said he noticed the domain name, a string of nonsensical letters ending in gwea.com, in the code. He saw that the domain wasn’t registered and thought of purchasing it. After buying the domain name, he pointed it to a ‘sinkhole’ server, which is used as a safe place to dump malicious web traffic, hoping simply to get more information about WannaCry.

“Immediately we saw five or six thousand connections a second.” He said that appeared to have stopped large numbers of attacks, but confessed he had done this “completely by accident.” However, he warned that despite this accidental save, people need to be precautious because the hackers could simply alter the program to carry on making attacks again. “If we did stop it, there’s like a 100 per cent chance they’re going to fire up a new sample and start that one again,” he said.

The WannaCry ransomware is spread by taking advantage of a Windows vulnerability that Microsoft released a security patch for in March. But computers and networks that didn’t update their systems remained at risk. Russia and Britain were among the worst-hit countries by the attack. The programme takes control over a user’s system and brings up a message telling users they can recover their files only if they send $300 (which has now believed to be increased to $600) in bitcoins to a specific address.

So far, Criminals behind WannaCry Ransomware have received nearly 100 payments from victims, total 15 Bitcoins, equals to USD $26,090.
Reported incidents from India
  • Till now, the global cyber-attack has affected more than 200,000 victims in 150 countries, which also includes India
  • Four computers of two village panchayats in Kerala were hit, at the Thariyode panchayat office in the hilly district of Wayanad
  • A section of computers of Andhra Pradesh’s police departments were affected too
  • Computers in 18 police units in Chittoor, Krishna, Guntur, Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam districts were affected
What should you do to be safe?
  • Keeping a back up is the safest and most effective way to deal with the threat
  • India’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has advised users to back up all their essential files offline, in a hard disk or pendrive
  • Individual users as well as organisations have been asked to apply patches to their Windows system(s) as mentioned in the Microsoft Bulletin MS17-010, which is marked critical
  • Don’t open emails or links in e-mails from people even in your contact list. E-mail has proven to an effective carrier in the case of ‘Wannacry’ ransomeware
  • Avoid downloading from websites that are not trustworthy; even attachments from unsolicited e-mails
  • Update Antivirus on all your systems and download Microsoft’s latest software patches. For unsuported Windows versions such as XP, Vista etc, the user can download the necessary patch from this link. http://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4012598
  • While browsing, one should steer clear from unsafe websites and employ essential filters on your browser.
  • Use security tools on IT ministry website for higher safety
What can be done if you are an victim to ransomware cyber attack?
  • Though there is no way out, there are a few loopholes one could use to either minimise the damage or stop it from spreading. According to CERT-In, the user should immediately disconnect the affected system to stop it from spreading.
  • Since the encryption does not happen instantly, the user should immediately try to back-up the essential files as soon as possible. This will help minimise the damage.
  • According to CERT-In, victims of the ransomware are advised not to pay the ransom as there is no gaurantee that the files will be returned. Instead, report any such case with CERT-In at Incident@cert.org.in and other law enforcement agencies. 
References
Also Read:

WannaCry Ransomware Analysis

What has happened?

On May 12, 2017 a new variant of the Ransom.CryptXXX family (Detected as Ransom.Wannacry) of ransomware began spreading widely impacting a large number of organizations, particularly in Europe.

What is the WannaCry ransomware?

WannaCry encrypts data files and ask users to pay a US$300 ransom in bitcoins. The ransom note indicates that the payment amount will be doubled after three days. If payment is not made after seven days, the encrypted files will be deleted.

Figure 1 Ransom demand screen displayed by WannaCry Trojan
Figure 1 Ransom demand screen displayed by WannaCry Trojan

It also drops a file named !Please Read Me!.txt which contains the ransom note.

Figure 2 Ransom demand note from WannaCry Trojan
Figure 2 Ransom demand note from WannaCry Trojan

WannaCry encrypts files with the following extensions, appending .WCRY to the end of the file name:

  • .123; .3dm; .3ds; .3g2; .3gp; .602; .7z; .ARC; .PAQ; .accdb; .aes; .ai; .asc; .asf; .asm; .asp; .avi; .backup; .bak; .bat; .bmp; .brd; .bz2; .cgm; .class; .cmd; .cpp; .crt; .cs; .csr; .csv; .db; .dbf; .dch; .der; .dif; .dip; .djvu; .doc; .docb; .docm; .docx; .dot; .dotm; .dotx; .dwg; .edb; .eml; .fla; .flv; .frm; .gif; .gpg; .gz; .hwp; .ibd; .iso; .jar; .java; .jpeg; .jpg; .js; .jsp; .key; .lay; .lay6; .ldf; .m3u; .m4u; .max; .mdb; .mdf; .mid; .mkv; .mml; .mov; .mp3; .mp4; .mpeg; .mpg; .msg; .myd; .myi; .nef; .odb; .odg; .odp; .ods; .odt; .onetoc2; .ost; .otg; .otp; .ots; .ott; .p12; .pas; .pdf; .pem; .pfx; .php; .pl; .png; .pot; .potm; .potx; .ppam; .pps; .ppsm; .ppsx; .ppt; .pptm; .pptx; .ps1; .psd; .pst; .rar; .raw; .rb; .rtf; .sch; .sh; .sldm; .sldx; .slk; .sln; .snt; .sql; .sqlite3; .sqlitedb; .stc; .std; .sti; .stw; .suo; .svg; .swf; .sxc; .sxd; .sxi; .sxm; .sxw; .tar; .tbk; .tgz; .tif; .tiff; .txt; .uop; .uot; .vb; .vbs; .vcd; .vdi; .vmdk; .vmx; .vob; .vsd; .vsdx; .wav; .wb2; .wk1; .wks; .wma; .wmv; .xlc; .xlm; .xls; .xlsb; .xlsm; .xlsx; .xlt; .xltm; .xltx; .xlw; .zip
Figure 3 How Ransomware Works
Figure 3 How Ransomware Works

It propagates to other computers by exploiting a known SMB remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Windows computers. (MS17-010)

Who is impacted?

A number of organizations globally have been affected, the majority of which are in Europe and China.

Is this a targeted attack?

No, this is not believed to be a targeted attack at this time. Ransomware campaigns are typically indiscriminate.

Am I protected against this threat?

The Blue Coat Global Intelligence Network (GIN) provides automatic detection to all enabled products for web-based infection attempts.

Symantec and Norton customers are protected against WannaCry using a combination of technologies.

Antivirus

Customers should run LiveUpdate and verify that they have the following definition versions or later installed in order to ensure they have the most up-to-date protection:

  • 20170512.009

SONAR protection

Network based protection

Symantec also has the following IPS protection in place which has proven highly effective in proactively blocking attempts to exploit the MS17-010 vulnerability:

The following IPS signature also blocks activity related to Ransom.Wannacry:

Organizations should also ensure that they have the latest Windows security updates installed, in particular MS17-010 to prevent spreading.

Why is it causing so many problems for organizations?

WannaCry has the ability to spread itself within corporate networks, without user interaction, by exploiting a known vulnerability in Microsoft Windows. Computers which do not have the latest Windows security updates applied are at risk of infection.

Can I recover the encrypted files?

Decryption is not available at this time but Symantec is investigating. Symantec does not recommend paying the ransom. Encrypted files should be restored from back-ups where possible.

What are best practices for protecting against ransomware?

  • New ransomware variants appear on a regular basis. Always keep your security software up to date to protect yourself against them.
  • Keep your operating system and other software updated. Software updates will frequently include patches for newly discovered security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by ransomware attackers.
  • Email is one of the main infection methods. Be wary of unexpected emails especially if they contain links and/or attachments.
  • Be extremely wary of any Microsoft Office email attachment that advises you to enable macros to view its content. Unless you are absolutely sure that this is a genuine email from a trusted source, do not enable macros and instead immediately delete the email.
  • Backing up important data is the single most effective way of combating ransomware infection. Attackers have leverage over their victims by encrypting valuable files and leaving them inaccessible. If the victim has backup copies, they can restore their files once the infection has been cleaned up. However organizations should ensure that back-ups are appropriately protected or stored off-line so that attackers can’t delete them.
  • Using cloud services could help mitigate ransomware infection, since many retain previous versions of files, allowing you to “roll back” to the unencrypted form.

Additional indicators and technical information about Ransom.Wannacry

When the Trojan is executed, it drops the following files:

  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\!WannaDecryptor!.exe
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\c.wry
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\f.wry
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\m.wry
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\r.wry
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\t.wry
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\u.wry
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\TaskHost
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\00000000.eky
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\00000000.pky
  • [PATH_TO_TROJAN]\00000000.res
  • %Temp%\0.WCRYT
  • %Temp%\1.WCRYT
  • %Temp%\2.WCRYT
  • %Temp%\3.WCRYT
  • %Temp%\4.WCRYT
  • %Temp%\5.WCRYT
  • %Temp%\hibsys.WCRYT

Note: [PATH_TO_TROJAN] is the path where the Trojan was originally executed.

The Trojan then creates the following registry entries:

  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\”Microsoft Update Task Scheduler” = “”[PATH_TO_TROJAN]\[TROJAN_EXE_NAME]” /r”
  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WannaCryptor\”wd” = “[PATH_TO_TROJAN]”

The Trojan also sets the following registry entry:

  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop\”Wallpaper” = “%UserProfile%\Desktop\!WannaCryptor!.bmp”

The Trojan creates the following mutexes:

  • Global\WINDOWS_TASKOSHT_MUTEX0
  • Global\WINDOWS_TASKCST_MUTEX

The Trojan then terminates the following processes using taskkil /f /iml:

  • sqlwriter.exe
  • sqlserver.exe
  • Microsoft.Exchange.*
  • MSExchange*

It then searches for and encrypts files with the following extensions:

  • .123; .3dm; .3ds; .3g2; .3gp; .602; .7z; .ARC; .PAQ; .accdb; .aes; .ai; .asc; .asf; .asm; .asp; .avi; .backup; .bak; .bat; .bmp; .brd; .bz2; .cgm; .class; .cmd; .cpp; .crt; .cs; .csr; .csv; .db; .dbf; .dch; .der; .dif; .dip; .djvu; .doc; .docb; .docm; .docx; .dot; .dotm; .dotx; .dwg; .edb; .eml; .fla; .flv; .frm; .gif; .gpg; .gz; .hwp; .ibd; .iso; .jar; .java; .jpeg; .jpg; .js; .jsp; .key; .lay; .lay6; .ldf; .m3u; .m4u; .max; .mdb; .mdf; .mid; .mkv; .mml; .mov; .mp3; .mp4; .mpeg; .mpg; .msg; .myd; .myi; .nef; .odb; .odg; .odp; .ods; .odt; .onetoc2; .ost; .otg; .otp; .ots; .ott; .p12; .pas; .pdf; .pem; .pfx; .php; .pl; .png; .pot; .potm; .potx; .ppam; .pps; .ppsm; .ppsx; .ppt; .pptm; .pptx; .ps1; .psd; .pst; .rar; .raw; .rb; .rtf; .sch; .sh; .sldm; .sldx; .slk; .sln; .snt; .sql; .sqlite3; .sqlitedb; .stc; .std; .sti; .stw; .suo; .svg; .swf; .sxc; .sxd; .sxi; .sxm; .sxw; .tar; .tbk; .tgz; .tif; .tiff; .txt; .uop; .uot; .vb; .vbs; .vcd; .vdi; .vmdk; .vmx; .vob; .vsd; .vsdx; .wav; .wb2; .wk1; .wks; .wma; .wmv; .xlc; .xlm; .xls; .xlsb; .xlsm; .xlsx; .xlt; .xltm; .xltx; .xlw; .zip

Encrypted files will have .WCRY appended to the end of the file names.

The Trojan then deletes the shadow copies of the encrypted files.

The Trojan drops the following files in every folder where files are encrypted:

  • !WannaDecryptor!.exe.lnk
  • !Please Read Me!.txt

The contents of the !Please Read Me!.txt is a text version of the ransom note with details of how to pay the ransom.

The Trojan downloads Tor and uses it to connect to a server using the Tor network.

It then displays a ransom note explaining to the user what has happened and how to pay the ransom.

Indicators of compromise

Hashes

  • dff26a9a44baa3ce109b8df41ae0a301d9e4a28ad7bd7721bbb7ccd137bfd696
  • 201f42080e1c989774d05d5b127a8cd4b4781f1956b78df7c01112436c89b2c9
  • ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa
  • c365ddaa345cfcaff3d629505572a484cff5221933d68e4a52130b8bb7badaf9
  • 09a46b3e1be080745a6d8d88d6b5bd351b1c7586ae0dc94d0c238ee36421cafa
  • b9c5d4339809e0ad9a00d4d3dd26fdf44a32819a54abf846bb9b560d81391c25
  • aae9536875784fe6e55357900519f97fee0a56d6780860779a36f06765243d56
  • 21ed253b796f63b9e95b4e426a82303dfac5bf8062bfe669995bde2208b360fd
  • 2372862afaa8e8720bc46f93cb27a9b12646a7cbc952cc732b8f5df7aebb2450
  • 24d004a104d4d54034dbcffc2a4b19a11f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c
  • f8812f1deb8001f3b7672b6fc85640ecb123bc2304b563728e6235ccbe782d85
  • 4a468603fdcb7a2eb5770705898cf9ef37aade532a7964642ecd705a74794b79
  • 4b76e54de0243274f97430b26624c44694fbde3289ed81a160e0754ab9f56f32
  • 9cc32c94ce7dc6e48f86704625b6cdc0fda0d2cd7ad769e4d0bb1776903e5a13
  • 78e3f87f31688355c0f398317b2d87d803bd87ee3656c5a7c80f0561ec8606df
  • be22645c61949ad6a077373a7d6cd85e3fae44315632f161adc4c99d5a8e6844
  • 5d26835be2cf4f08f2beeff301c06d05035d0a9ec3afacc71dff22813595c0b9
  • 76a3666ce9119295104bb69ee7af3f2845d23f40ba48ace7987f79b06312bbdf
  • fc626fe1e0f4d77b34851a8c60cdd11172472da3b9325bfe288ac8342f6c710a
  • eeb9cd6a1c4b3949b2ff3134a77d6736b35977f951b9c7c911483b5caeb1c1fb
  • 043e0d0d8b8cda56851f5b853f244f677bd1fd50f869075ef7ba1110771f70c2
  • 57c12d8573d2f3883a8a0ba14e3eec02ac1c61dee6b675b6c0d16e221c3777f4
  • ca29de1dc8817868c93e54b09f557fe14e40083c0955294df5bd91f52ba469c8
  • f7c7b5e4b051ea5bd0017803f40af13bed224c4b0fd60b890b6784df5bd63494
  • 3e6de9e2baacf930949647c399818e7a2caea2626df6a468407854aaa515eed9
  • 9b60c622546dc45cca64df935b71c26dcf4886d6fa811944dbc4e23db9335640
  • 5ad4efd90dcde01d26cc6f32f7ce3ce0b4d4951d4b94a19aa097341aff2acaec
  • 24d004a104d4d54034dbcffc2a4b19a11f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c
  • 12d67c587e114d8dde56324741a8f04fb50cc3160653769b8015bc5aec64d20b
  • 85ce324b8f78021ecfc9b811c748f19b82e61bb093ff64f2eab457f9ef19b186
  • 3f3a9dde96ec4107f67b0559b4e95f5f1bca1ec6cb204bfe5fea0230845e8301

IP Addresses

  • 231.221.221:9001
  • 31.0.39:9191
  • 202.160.69:9001
  • 101.166.19:9090
  • 121.65.179:9001
  • 3.69.209:9001
  • 0.32.144:9001
  • 7.161.218:9001
  • 79.179.177:9001
  • 61.66.116:9003
  • 47.232.237:9001
  • 30.158.223:9001
  • 172.193.32:443
  • 229.72.16:443

Domains

  • iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com (sinkholed)
  • Rphjmrpwmfv6v2e[dot]onion
  • Gx7ekbenv2riucmf[dot]onion
  • 57g7spgrzlojinas[dot]onion
  • xxlvbrloxvriy2c5[dot]onion
  • 76jdd2ir2embyv47[dot]onion
  • cwwnhwhlz52maqm7[dot]onion

Filenames

  • @Please_Read_Me@.txt
  • @WanaDecryptor@.exe
  • @WanaDecryptor@.exe.lnk
  • Please Read Me!.txt (Older variant)
  • C:\WINDOWS\tasksche.exe
  • C:\WINDOWS\qeriuwjhrf
  • bat
  • bat
  • bat
  • [0-9]{15}.bat #regex
  • !WannaDecryptor!.exe.lnk
  • pky
  • eky
  • res
  • C:\WINDOWS\system32\taskdl.exe

Bitcoin Wallets

  • 115p7UMMngoj1pMvkpHijcRdfJNXj6LrLn
  • 13AM4VW2dhxYgXeQepoHkHSQuy6NgaEb94
  • 12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw
Here is a snort rule submitted to Sans from Marco Novak:

alert tcp $HOME_NET 445 -> any any (msg:”ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE MS17-010 Echo Response”; flow:from_server,established; content:”|00 00 00 31 ff|SMB|2b 00 00 00 00 98 07 c0|”; depth:16; fast_pattern; content:”|4a 6c 4a 6d 49 68 43 6c 42 73 72 00|”; distance:0; flowbits:isset,ETPRO.ETERNALBLUE; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2024218; rev:2;)

And other SNORT rules from Emerging Threats:

(http://docs.emergingthreats.net/bin/view/Main/2024218)

alert smb any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:”ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE MS17-010 Echo Request (set)”; flow:to_server,established; content:”|00 00 00 31 ff|SMB|2b 00 00 00 00 18 07 c0|”; depth:16; fast_pattern; content:”|4a 6c 4a 6d 49 68 43 6c 42 73 72 00|”; distance:0; flowbits:set,ETPRO.ETERNALBLUE; flowbits:noalert; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2024220; rev:1;)

alert smb $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:”ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE MS17-010 Echo Response”; flow:from_server,established; content:”|00 00 00 31 ff|SMB|2b 00 00 00 00 98 07 c0|”; depth:16; fast_pattern; content:”|4a 6c 4a 6d 49 68 43 6c 42 73 72 00|”; distance:0; flowbits:isset,ETPRO.ETERNALBLUE; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2024218; rev:1;)

 

Yara:

rule wannacry_1 : ransom

{

meta:

author = “Joshua Cannell”

description = “WannaCry Ransomware strings”

weight = 100

date = “2017-05-12”




Strings:

$s1 = “Ooops, your files have been encrypted!” wide ascii nocase

$s2 = “Wanna Decryptor” wide ascii nocase

$s3 = “.wcry” wide ascii nocase

$s4 = “WANNACRY” wide ascii nocase

$s5 = “WANACRY!” wide ascii nocase

$s7 = “icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q” wide ascii nocase




Condition:

any of them

}

rule wannacry_2{

meta:

author = “Harold Ogden”

description = “WannaCry Ransomware Strings”

date = “2017-05-12”

weight = 100

strings:

$string1 = “msg/m_bulgarian.wnry”

$string2 = “msg/m_chinese (simplified).wnry”

$string3 = “msg/m_chinese (traditional).wnry”

$string4 = “msg/m_croatian.wnry”

$string5 = “msg/m_czech.wnry”

$string6 = “msg/m_danish.wnry”

$string7 = “msg/m_dutch.wnry”

$string8 = “msg/m_english.wnry”

$string9 = “msg/m_filipino.wnry”

$string10 = “msg/m_finnish.wnry”

$string11 = “msg/m_french.wnry”

$string12 = “msg/m_german.wnry”

$string13 = “msg/m_greek.wnry”

$string14 = “msg/m_indonesian.wnry”

$string15 = “msg/m_italian.wnry”

$string16 = “msg/m_japanese.wnry”

$string17 = “msg/m_korean.wnry”

$string18 = “msg/m_latvian.wnry”

$string19 = “msg/m_norwegian.wnry”

$string20 = “msg/m_polish.wnry”

$string21 = “msg/m_portuguese.wnry”

$string22 = “msg/m_romanian.wnry”

$string23 = “msg/m_russian.wnry”

$string24 = “msg/m_slovak.wnry”

$string25 = “msg/m_spanish.wnry”

$string26 = “msg/m_swedish.wnry”

$string27 = “msg/m_turkish.wnry”

$string28 = “msg/m_vietnamese.wnry”

condition:

any of ($string*)

}

 

McAfee urges all its customers to ensure McAfee’s DAT updates have been applied to ensure the latest protection. We furthermore advise customers to be diligent in applying security updates for all the software solutions they use.

References:

Malware targeting Banking apps on Google Play

Reported as on 22 FEB 2017 about a banking malware Good weather that infected 5000 users in just two days after the malicious app managed to bypass Google’s security mechanisms and appeared in the store on February 4, 2017.


How does this malware work?

  • An unsuspecting user installs the app from Google playstore on his Android mobile

descripcion-good-weather

Malicious app description as found on Google Play
Malicious app description as found on Google Play
  • The infected device then displays a fake system screen requesting device administrator rights on behalf of fictitious “System update”. By enabling these rights, the victim allows the malware to Change the screen-unlock password and Lock the screen.
Green – legitimate Good Weather icon, Red – malicious version
Green – legitimate Good Weather icon, Red – malicious version
Fake “System update” demanding device administrator rights
Fake “System update” demanding device administrator rights
  • The trojan displays a fake login screen once the user runs one of the targeted banking apps and sends entered data to the attacker. Thanks to the permission to intercept the victims’ text messages, the malware is also able to bypass SMS-based two-factor authentication.

Is this the only malicious app on Google play that we need to worry about?

No, this is just one of such apps on Google play. A security researcher recently posted about another such banking malware Funny Videos 2017 which was updated on Google play as recent as April 8, 2017 and had 1k to 5k installs (which is a lot for banking malware).

Funny Videos 2017 app in Google Play (no longer available)
Funny Videos 2017 app in Google Play (no longer available)
additional Google Play app info
additional Google Play app info

Precautionary measures from Google:

Google has decided to take the app out of the Play Store. As it turns out, the malware is mostly phishing for credit card details and internet banking credentials. Screenshots of some of the phishing overlays can be seen in the image below.

List of apps pulled down from Google Play store
List of apps pulled down from Google Play store

Targeted apps

A long list of over 420 Banks worldwide are affected by such banking malwares. The list as on April, 2017 is:

aib.ibank.android
aib.ibank.android.tablet
ar.bapro
ar.bapro.tablet
ar.com.redlink.ciudad
ar.com.santander.rio.mbanking
ar.macro
ar.nbad.emobile.android.mobilebank
at.bawag.mbanking
at.bawag.tablet
at.easybank.mbanking
at.erstebank.george
at.ing.diba.client.onlinebanking
at.oberbank.mbanking
at.psa.app.bawag
at.spardat.netbanking
at.volksbank.volksbankmobile
au.com.amp.myportfolio.android
au.com.bankwest.mobile
au.com.heritage.app
au.com.ingdirect.android
au.com.macquarie.banking
au.com.mebank.banking
au.com.nab.mobile
au.com.nab.mobile.android.nabconnect
au.com.pnbank.android
au.com.suncorp.SuncorpBank
biz.mobinex.android.apps.cep_sifrematik
cedacri.mobile.bank.asti
cedacri.mobile.bank.bppb
cedacri.mobile.bank.desio.brianza
ch.raiffeisen.android
ch.raiffeisen.phototan
co.uk.Nationwide.Mobile
com.AlinmaSoftToken
com.BOQSecure
com.BankAlBilad
com.CredemMobile
com.EurobankEFG
com.IngDirectAndroid
com.QIIB
com.SifrebazCep
com.VBSmartPhoneApp
com.a2a.android.burgan
com.abnamro.grip
com.abnamro.nl.mobile.payments
com.abnamro.nl.mobile.wallet
com.adcb.bank
com.adib.mbs
com.akbank.android.apps.akbank_direkt
com.akbank.android.apps.akbank_direkt_tablet
com.akbank.softotp
com.alahli.mobile.android
com.alinma.smartphone
com.alpha.pass
com.amanalrajhi
com.anz.android.gomoney
com.appfactory.tmb
com.arabbank.arabimobile
com.axabanque.fr
com.axis.cbk
com.bancamarch.bancamovil
com.bancomer.mbanking
com.bancsabadell.wallet
com.bankaustria.android.olb
com.bankia.wallet
com.bankinter.launcher
com.bankinter.portugal.bmb
com.bankofireland.mobilebanking
com.bankofqueensland.boq
com.bankofqueensland.boqtablet
com.barclays.android.barclaysmobilebanking
com.barclays.bca
com.barclays.portugal.ui
com.bawagpsk.securityapp
com.bbva.bbvacontigo
com.bbva.bbvawalletmx
com.bbva.netcash
com.bbva.netcashar
com.bbva.nxt_tablet
com.bendigobank.mobile
com.binckbank.evolution
com.bnpp.easybanking
com.boi.tablet365
com.boubyanapp.boubyan.bank
com.boursorama.android.clients
com.bsffm
com.business_token
com.caisse.epargne.android.tablette
com.caisseepargne.android.mobilebanking
com.cajamar.GCCajamar
com.cajasur.android
com.carrefour.bank
com.cba.android.netbank
com.cba.shiraz
com.cbd.mobile
com.cbq.CBMobile
com.cic_prod.bad
com.cic_prod_tablet.bad
com.citi.regional.argentina
com.citibank.mobile.au
com.citibank.mobile.citiuaePAT
com.cleverlance.csas.servis24
com.cm_prod.bad
com.cm_prod_tablet.bad
com.comarch.mobile
com.comarch.mobile.banking.bnpparibas
com.comarch.security.mobilebanking
com.comdirect.phototan
com.commbank.netbank
com.commerzbank.kontostand
com.commerzbank.photoTAN
com.cs.vasco
com.csg.cs.dnmb
com.db.mm.deutschebank
com.db.mobilebanking
com.db.pbc.miabanca
com.db.pbc.mibanco
com.db.pbc.phototan.db
com.db.tabbanking
com.defencebank.locationapp
com.dib.app
com.ducont.meethaq
com.ducont.muscatbank
com.entersekt.authapp.dkb
com.ezmcom.softtoken.adcb
com.finansbank.mobile.cepsube
com.finanteq.finance.ca
com.firstdirect.bankingonthego
com.fpe.comptenickel
com.fullsix.android.labanquepostale.accountaccess
com.fusion.banking
com.fusion.beyondbank
com.garanti.bonusapp
com.garanti.cepbank
com.garanti.cepsubesi
com.getingroup.mobilebanking
com.gieseckedevrient.android.wallet.rabo
com.google.android.1gm1
com.greater.Greater
com.grppl.android.shell.BOS
com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73
com.grppl.android.shell.halifax
com.hipotecario.mobile
com.hsbc.hsbcukcmb
com.htsu.hsbcpersonalbanking
com.icbc.mobile.abroadARG
com.icomvision.bsc.mobilebank
com.ideaknow.ing
com.ie.capitalone.uk
com.iflex.fcat.mobile.android
com.imb.banking2
com.ing.diba.mbbr2
com.ing.diba.smartsecure2
com.ing.mobile
com.ing.mobilepayments
com.ingbanktr.cuzdan
com.ingbanktr.ingmobil
com.intertech.mobilemoneytransfer.activity
com.isis_papyrus.raiffeisen_pay_eyewdg
com.kbc.mobilebanking
com.kfh.kfhonline
com.kutxabank.android
com.kutxabank.appatxas
com.kuveytturk.mobil
com.latuabanca_tabperandroid
com.latuabancaperandroid
com.latuabancaperandroid.ispb
com.latuabancaperandroid.pg
com.lcl.application.tablette
com.lloydsbank.businessmobile
com.magiclick.odeabank
com.mbanking.nbb
com.mediaengine.allianzbank
com.mediolanum.android.bst
com.mediolanum.android.fullbanca
com.mediolanum.android.wallet
com.mobileloft.alpha.droid
com.mobilenik.bsf
com.mobilenik.ubika.bna
com.monitise.client.android.clydesdale
com.monitise.client.android.yorkshire
com.monitise.coop
com.mosync.app_Banco_Galicia
com.nbo.ar
com.nbo.mobs
com.ncb.softtoken
com.nearform.ptsb
com.niobiumlabs.eurobank.activity
com.ofss.fcdb.mobile.android.phone.bahl.launcher
com.opentecheng.android.webank
com.paypal.android.p2pmobile
com.paypal.here
com.posteitaliane.postemobilestore
com.pozitron.anb
com.pozitron.ingkurumsal
com.pozitron.iscep
com.pozitron.vakifbank
com.rak
com.rbs.mobile.android.natwest
com.rbs.mobile.android.natwestbandc
com.rbs.mobile.android.rbsbandc
com.rbs.mobile.android.rbsm
com.rbs.mobile.android.ubn
com.rev.mobilebanking.westpac
com.rsi
com.rsi.ruralviatablet
com.s4m
com.sa.baj.aljazirasmart
com.sabb
com.samba.mb
com.scb.ae.bmw
com.scrignosa
com.sella.BancaSella
com.softtech.isbankasi
com.solidpass.main.bsf
com.starfinanz.mobile.android.dkbpushtan
com.starfinanz.mobile.android.pushtan
com.starfinanz.smob.android.sbanking
com.starfinanz.smob.android.sbanking.tablet
com.starfinanz.smob.android.sfinanzstatus
com.starfinanz.smob.android.sfinanzstatus.tablet
com.supervielle.mBanking
com.swmind.vcc.android.bzwbk_mobile.app
com.targo_prod.bad
com.targo_prod_tablet.bad
com.teb
com.tecnocom.cajalaboral
com.tescobank.mobile
com.tmob.denizbank
com.tmobtech.halkbank
com.ubank.internetbanking
com.ubs.swidK2Y.android
com.ubs.swidKXJ.android
com.unicajaTabletas
com.unicredit
com.vakifbank.mobile
com.vipera.ts.starter.FGB
com.vipera.ts.starter.MashreqAE
com.vipera.ts.starter.MashreqQA
com.vipera.ts.starter.QNB
com.ykb.android
com.ykb.android.db
com.ykb.android.mobilonay
com.ykb.androidtablet
com.ykb.avm
com.zentity.ing
com.ziraat.ziraatmobil
coop.bancocredicoop.bancamobile
cz.airbank.android
cz.csas.app.mujstav
cz.csas.business24
cz.csob.smartbanking
cz.csob.smartklic
cz.kb.mba.business
cz.mbank
cz.moneta.smartbanka
cz.rb.app.smartphonebanking
cz.sberbankcz
cz.ulikeit.fio
de.adesso.mobile.android.gadfints
de.comdirect
de.comdirect.android
de.commerzbanking.mobil
de.consorsbank
de.dkb.portalapp
de.dzbank.kartenregie
de.fgi.ms.securesign
de.fgi.ms.vrsecurecard
de.fiducia.smartphone.android.banking.bb
de.fiducia.smartphone.android.banking.psd
de.fiducia.smartphone.android.banking.vr
de.fiducia.smartphone.android.securego.vr
de.ing_diba.kontostand
de.postbank.finanzassistent
de.sdvrz.ihb.mobile.app
de.sdvrz.ihb.mobile.secureapp.netbank.produktion
de.sdvrz.ihb.mobile.secureapp.sparda.produktion
enbd.mobilebanking
enbd.mobilebanking.ksamobile
enbd.mobilebanking.smartbusiness
es.bancopopular.nbmpopular
es.bancopopular.nbmpopulartablet
es.bancosantander.apps
es.bancosantander.empresas
es.bancosantander.wallet
es.bmn.bmnapp2
es.bmn.cajagranadaapp2
es.bmn.cajamurciaapp2
es.bmn.sanostraapp2
es.caixagalicia.activamovil
es.caixageral.caixageralapp
es.ccm.ccmapp
es.cm.android
es.cm.android.tablet
es.connectis.mobile.alrajhi
es.evobanco.bancamovil
es.lacaixa.hceicon2
es.lacaixa.mobile.android.newwapicon
es.liberbank.cajasturapp
es.redsys.walletmb.app.kutxa.pro
es.redsys.walletmb.app.laboralkutxa.pro
es.santander.money
es.univia.unicajamovil
eu.eleader.mobilebanking.abk
eu.eleader.mobilebanking.bre
eu.eleader.mobilebanking.nbk
eu.eleader.mobilebanking.pekao
eu.eleader.mobilebanking.pekao.firm
eu.eleader.mobilebanking.raiffeisen
eu.inmite.prj.kb.mobilbank
finansbank.enpara
fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus
fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus.pro
fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplustablet
fr.bred.fr
fr.creditagricole.androidapp
fr.creditagricole.macarteca
fr.lcl.android.customerarea
fr.lcl.android.entreprise
ftb.ibank.android
gr.winbank.mobile
hr.asseco.android.jimba.mUCI.cz
hr.asseco.android.jimba.mUCI.cz.tablet
hr.asseco.android.mtoken.credem.credemprod
hr.asseco.android.mtoken.pekao
it.bcc.iccrea.mycartabcc
it.bnl.androidTablet
it.bnl.apps.banking
it.bpm.bpmandroid
it.bpm.ptbandroid
it.carige
it.cividale.bpconline
it.copergmps.rt.pf.android.sp.bmps
it.copergmps.rt.pf.android.tab.ui.bmps
it.creval.bancaperta
it.elfisystems.ncbc.droid.tablet
it.elfisystems.ncbc.mobile
it.gruppobper.ams.android.bper
it.ingdirect.app
it.nogood.container
it.popso.SCRIGNOapp
it.relaxbanking
it.reply.up.mobile.android
it.secservizi.mobile.atime
it.secservizi.mobile.atime.bpaa
it.secservizi.mobile.atime.bpvi
it.ubi.digitalcode
it.ubiss.mpay
it.volksbank.android
mbanking.NBG
mobi.societegenerale.mobile.lappli
mobi.societegenerale.mobile.lapplipro
mobile.alphabank.myAlphaWallet_android
mobile.santander.de
net.atos.alrajhi.mobilekw
net.bnpparibas.mescomptes
net.inverline.bancosabadell.officelocator.android
nl.asnbank.asnbankieren
nl.rabomobiel
nl.regiobank.regiobankieren
nl.snsbank.snsbankieren
nl.snsbank.snshelp
nz.co.amp.myportfolio.android
nz.co.anz.android.mobilebanking
nz.co.asb.asbmobile
nz.co.asb.mobilebusiness
nz.co.bnz.droidbanking
nz.co.bnz.droidbusinessbanking
nz.co.cooperativebank
nz.co.kiwibank.mobile
nz.co.westpac
org.banelco
org.banelco.ibay
org.banelco.qlms
org.banelco.rbts
org.banelco.sdmr
org.banking.bom.businessconnect
org.banking.bsa.businessconnect
org.banking.stg.businessconnect
org.banksa.bank
org.bom.bank
org.microemu.android.model.common.VTUserApplicationLIN
org.microemu.android.model.common.VTUserApplicationLIN
org.stgeorge.bank
org.westpac.bank
org.westpac.col
pl.aliorbank.kantorwalutowy
pl.bzwbk.bzwbk24
pl.bzwbk.ibiznes24
pl.bzwbk.mobile.tab.bzwbk24
pl.com.suntech.mobileconnect
pl.eurobank
pl.ing.ingmobile
pl.ipko.mobile
pl.mbank
pl.millennium.corpApp
pl.pkobp.iko
posteitaliane.posteapp.appbpol
pt.BancoPopular.android.app
pt.bancobest.android.mobilebanking
pt.bancobpi.mobile.autorizacoesempresas
pt.bancobpi.mobile.fiabilizacao
pt.bes.bestablet
pt.cgd.caixadirecta
pt.cgd.caixadirectaempresas
pt.novobanco.nbapp
pt.santandertotta.mobileparticulares
pt.sibs.android.mbway
riyad.bankingapp.android
rm.beleggen
tr.com.sekerbilisim.mbank
tsb.mobilebanking
uk.co.bankofscotland.businessbank
uk.co.metrobankonline.personal.mobile
uk.co.northernbank.android.tribank
uk.co.santander.businessUK.bb
uk.co.santander.santanderUK
uk.co.tsb.mobilebank
wit.android.bcpBankingApp.activoBank
wit.android.bcpBankingApp.millennium
wit.android.bcpBankingApp.millenniumPL
www.ingdirect.nativeframe
Çom.android.vendin?

How to clean the infected devices?

To clean your device, you can turn to a renowned mobile security solution, such as ESET Mobile Security, or you can remove the malware manually.

How to be safe going forward?

  • Although not flawless, Google Play does employ advanced security mechanisms to keep malware out. As this may not be the case with alternative app stores or other unknown sources, opt for the official Google Play store whenever possible.
  • While downloading from the Play store, make sure to get to know the app permissions before installing or updating.
  • Think about uninstalling apps that run without privileged permissions
  • Even if all fails, a mobile security solution will protect the device from active threats

Security Vulnerabilities as on 13-Apr-2017

Top 10 Vulnerable Products and their Vendors as on 13-Apr-2017.

Sl. No. Vendor Number of Vulnerabilities
1 Apple 271
2 IBM 252
3 Linux 246
4 Google 242
5 Oracle 235
6 Microsoft 140
7 Imagemagick 112
8 Cisco 88
9 Abode 80
10 Huawei 66
CVEDetails Top 10 Vulnerable Vendors APR2017
CVEDetails Top 10 Vulnerable Vendors as on 13th April 2017

Here are the vulnerabilities by type
CVEDetails Number Of Vulnerabilities APR2017

CVEDetails Number Of Vulnerabilities APR2017


SecureFirst Solutions Private Limited is a security centric Product-cum-Services Organization assisting its Clients to develop and maintain security applications. Our offerings are classified broadly into two categories:
1. Product: Vulnerability Management System (VMS)
2. Services: Security as a Service (SaaS)
3. On-premise classroom trainings

Download our brochure at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/downloads/SecureFirstSolutions_Brochure.pdf

Learn more about our Security Offerings at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/

 

More than 700 India Government websites hacked between 2013 and 2016

On the 8th of February 2017, Lok Sabha was informed about the various central and state government websites hacking incidents in the past four years.

Of the total 707 websites, 199 were hacked in 2016; 164 in 2015; 155 in 2014 and 189 in 2013, Minister of State for Home Affairs for home Hansraj Gangaram Ahir said in a written reply to Lok Sabha.

Cyber Crimes up by more than 3 times in 5 years

Number Of Cases Registered during 2011 to 2015
Source: https://factly.in/cyber-crimes-in-india-which-state-tops-the-chart/
Cyber Crimes In States (2011 to 2015)
Cyber Crimes In States (2011 to 2015)
Number Of Websites Hacked between 2013 to 2016
Number Of Websites Hacked between 2013 to 2016

Of the 8,348 persons arrested under different provisions of law relating to cyber-crime laws, only 315 were convicted during 2014-15, the government said.

Number Of Hackers Arrested vs. convicted during 2014-2015
Number Of Hackers Arrested vs. convicted during 2014-2015

Recent cyber-attacks:

  • The website of National Security Guard (NSG), a paramilitary force comprising anti-terror crack commandos, was partially defaced and abusive messages posted on the home page by unknown hackers on January 1. The website which is hosted on National Informatics Center (NIC) Server was blocked immediately.
  • Similar cyber-attacks were reported on websites of ordnance factories as well as railways.
  • As per Trishneet Arora, CEO of TAC Security, just after Narendra Modi announced the demonetization on November 8, more than 50 hacking incidents were reported in a month’s time. TAC Security’s specially designed service — Cyber Emergency Response Team (TAC-CERT) — received hacking complaints that included
    • Seven (07) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
    • Twelve (12) E-mail hacks
    • Twenty-Four (24) ransomware attacks
    • Four (04) financial frauds through e-mail and
    • Six (06) website hackings across verticals such as export companies (ransomware and financial loss), pharmaceutical companies, manufactures of electrical parts, a hospital (data breach) and IT companies (DDoS attacks)

Actions from the government:

  • Per Arora, in a move to help the organizations reduce the risk of hacking:
    • Information Technology Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad has ordered a review of the entire IT infrastructure in the country
    • The government recently announced to set up the National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) to provide near real-time situational awareness and rapid response to cyber-attacks. The center is expected to be operational by March 2017
    • The Ministry of Electronics and IT has also ordered review of the IT Act, 2000, and set up a crack team to respond to cyber security incidents quickly
    • TAC CERT helps organizations in quick recovery by patching the loopholes and within hours, your service will be back to normal and function smoothly
  • Supreme Court judge Madan B Lokur today said:
    • We need to think about a legislation to prevent cyber-crimes. Between 2014-15 there has been a 20.5 percent rise in cyber-crimes and we don’t see the number coming down any(time) soon
    • Cybersecurity is crucial. Government websites also get hacked and misused due to which public is often misled with wrong information. There is a need for preventive measures
    • Given the endemic delays in the justice delivery system, we need to come up with a preventive legislation to handle the offenders. We need to be one step ahead of the offenders. A legislative policy is important
  • Delhi High Court judge Sanjeev Sachdeva:
    • Cyber-bullying through smartphones is severely affecting children and in some cases even driving them to commit suicide. The virtual reality games on phones are taking them away from real world and into the digital world
  • National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB):
    • 60% crime was committed by persons under the age of 30 in 2015. A campaign to educate people about internet offences is needed. ”With the social media, lot of private information is getting transmitted. What is of concern is commercial data and there is a need to preserve it. Unless there is a method to preserve it, any person can hack it and misuse it

References:

 

Security Vulnerabilities during 01-Dec-2016 to 09-Dec-2016

Top 10 Vulnerable Products and their Vendors in 2016.

Sl. No. Product Vendor Number of Vulnerabilities
1 Android Google 515
2 Debian Linux Debian 314
3 Ubuntu Linux Canonical 272
4 Leap Novell 257
5 Flash Player Adobe 249
6 Opensuse Novell 228
7 Acrobat Reader Dc Adobe 227
8 Acrobat Dc Adobe 227
9 Acrobat Adobe 224
10 Mac OS X Apple 215
CVE Details Top 10 Vulnerable Products and their Vendors in 2016
CVE Details Top 10 Vulnerable Products and their Vendors in 2016

Here are the list of security vulnerabilities during the period 01-Dec-2016 to 09-Dec-2016 as reported by CVEDetails. A total of 11 security vulnerabilities were reported.

CVE Details 01-Dec To 09-Dec-2016
CVE Details 01-Dec To 09-Dec-2016

Here are the list of Threats during the period 01-Dec-2016 to 09-Dec-2016 as reported by Symantec. A total of 14 threats (includes Trojans, Viruses and Worms) were reported.

Symantec 01-Dec To 09-Dec-2016
Symantec 01-Dec To 09-Dec-2016


SecureFirst Solutions Private Limited is a security centric Product-cum-Services Organization assisting its Clients to develop and maintain security applications. Our offerings are classified broadly into two categories:
1. Product: Vulnerability Management System (VMS)
2. Services: Security as a Service (SaaS)

Download our brochure at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/downloads/SecureFirstSolutions_Brochure.pdf

Learn more about our Security Offerings at: http://securefirstsolutions.com/